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David Cook * and Michael B. Devereux
This paper examines demand spillovers in a two country open econ- 
omy model to a demand shock newline (emanating from a single, 
source country) sufficiently large to push one or both countries into 
a liquidity trap. The zero lower bound on nominal interest rates 
keeps the central bank in the source country from fully adjusting 
monetary policy. We describe a two country New Keynesian model 
with sufficient home bias so as to exclude symmetric movements in 
response to demand shocks. We study conditions under which a 
liquidity trap in one country might spillover to a trading partner. We 
study, under which conditions, a liquidity trap in one country will 
lead to a liquidity trap in another country. We also show conditions 
under which a liquidity trap in another country can spillover into an 
output expansion in a trading partner. 
Keywords: Liquidity trap, Monetary policy, Fiscal policy, 
International spillovers
JEL Classification: E2, E5, E6
I. Introduction
During 2008 and 2009, emerging markets and developed economies 
alike experienced a substantial deterioration in economic conditions (see 
Park and Lee 2009). We might think of the global economic crisis, as a 
financial tsunami flowing from a negative shock in one country through 
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the open ocean of liberalized trade and financial markets to spill over to 
the economies of other countries. Indeed, natural causes of the slump 
have been identified in the real estate pricing crashes that occurred in 
the United States, along with some European economies. However, the 
consequences have not been limited to those countries whose financial 
systems might be thought to be most directly implicated. This paper will 
study the analytics of international demand spillovers in a global liquidity 
crisis.
A key element of the crisis was the limitation it exposed in monetary 
policy practice. Given the deflationary aspects of the crisis, inflation tar- 
geting central banks might have been expected to respond by lowering 
interest rates. However, the sheer depth of the crisis prevented central 
banks from responding adequately, as money market rates cannot be 
reduced below the zero lower bound. This lack of a full monetary policy 
response can explain some of the size of the economic damage.
In the international environment, though, it is important to consider 
the monetary policy response of foreign trading partners to a liquidity 
crisis whose source comes from one country. Naturally, if the global slump 
is sufficiently severe that foreign trading partners are pushed toward 
the zero lower bound, then monetary policy will lose effectiveness world 
wide. However, foreign trading partners that retain monetary policy ef- 
fectiveness may not only stabilize the impact of foreign shocks on their 
own economy but also impact the cyclical response of other countries 
that might find themselves at their own lower bound.
To study the issue of financial spillovers, we will construct a two coun- 
try sticky price dynamic general equilibrium rational expectations model 
which can be used to explore, analytically, negative spillovers that might 
lead to a global financial slump. One key feature of the model will be 
persistent price stickiness. This allows for the examination of persistent 
demand shocks. A second feature is the modeling of home bias in pre- 
ferences over goods. This can be thought of as a measure of the open- 
ness of countries to international trade. Home bias is an essential aspect 
of the model in order to capture the fact that international trade in most 
countries is a limited fraction of the share of GDP. Perhaps more impor- 
tantly, the modelling of realistic home bias will be critical in studying 
the effects of demand shocks. In the absence of home bias, consumers 
in all countries will have the same market basket; demand shocks in 
one country would be felt symmetrically across all countries. Under more 
realistic parameterizations of home bias, trading partners may not move 
in parallel. 
             THE GLOBAL VS. LOCAL LIQUIDITY TRAPS 473
This paper follows a large literature which examines issues related to 
monetary policy at the zero lower bound including Krugman (1998), 
Eggertson and Woodford (2003, 2005), Jung et al. (2005), and  Auerbach 
and Obstfeld (2005). Eggertsson (2009) and Woodford (2011) study the 
analytics of the fiscal multiplier in a closed economy. and many other 
writers explored how monetary and fiscal policy could be usefully em- 
ployed even when the authorities have no further room to reduce short 
term nominal interest rates. Fujiwara et al. (2010a) examine the optimal 
monetary problem with commitment in a multi country situation under 
conditions of no home bias. Fujiwara et al. (2010b) examine monetary 
policy spillover responses to cost-push shocks in a global liquidity trap. 
Bodenstein et al. (2009) examine the effects of foreign shocks at the zero 
lower bound. Jeanne (2009) examines a `global liquidity trap' using one- 
period sticky prices.
II. A Two Country Model of Interacting Monetary and 
Fiscal Policy
The model of the economy will feature two equally sized countries, 
designated `home' and `foreign.' Firms of each country produces a speci- 
fic range of differentiated goods for global consumption. Households in 
each country consume a specific market basket of private goods consis- 
ting of goods from both countries. Potentially, households will consume 
a market basket of goods that is more heavily concentrated on the goods 
produced in the home country. We measure this ‘home bias' with a 
single parameter, 1＜ν＜2; the steady state share of foreign goods con- 
sumed by a home household is ν/2. Though, consumer households may 
have a home bias in consumption, we assume full risk sharing in finan- 
cial markets. When ν＝1, there is no home bias. For ν＞1, the home 
consumer puts a higher weight on consuming home goods. For ν＝2, 
home bias is complete, and we have effectively two closed economies.
The goods produced in each country are produced with a constant 
returns to scale function of labor. Due to our focus on demand shocks, 
we abstract from technology and cost-push shocks. Producers of differ- 
entiated goods are monopolistic competitors and set prices to maximize 
profits. Firms are not free to adjust their prices instantly. Instead, only 
a fraction of firms are able to adjust their prices at any time, as in the 
Calvo pricing model. Consumer households act as workers and have a 
disutility of labor (in addition getting utility from private goods).
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In the Appendix, we specify the full model which follows Cook and 
Devereux (2011).1 We assume the existence of a shock to the subjective 
discount factor, ξt, which shifts the weight that preferences put on cur- 
rent consumption toward future consumption. We will construct a macro- 
economic model from log-linearized versions of the Euler equations of the 
optimization problem of households and profit maximizing firms. The 
equations will be linearized around the non-stochastic steady state. We 
assume that 1) the government operates a set of subsidies financed with 
lump sum taxes to insure that the steady state economy (which features 
monopolistic consumption) operates at a level consistent to the perfectly 
competitive, first best equilibrium; 2) that monetary policy is set so that 
the flexible price equilibrium would feature zero inflation.
Define the demand shock variable in the home economy, εt≡UCξ /UC
ln (ξt ), as the preference shock multiplied by the marginal impact of the 
shock on marginal utility of consumption relative to marginal utility of 
consumption evaluated at the steady state. In order to examine the econ- 
omy at the zero lower bound liquidity trap, we assume that this shock 
term follows of a Markov process. Assume that at time t there is an 
unanticipated fall in ε t to ε ̄L＜0. Assume that εt reverts back to 0 with 
probability 1－μ in each period henceforth, and then remains at 0 there- 
after. We assume that the parallel foreign demand shock is zero, ε t*. We 
will assume that the home economy is the source of the global slump.
A. Demand Shocks Natural Interest Rates
Define σ≡－(UCCC̅)/UC as the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution in consumption at the steady state, φ≡－(V”H̅ )/V’ as the 
elasticity of the marginal disutility of hours worked. We will assume that 
households have (realistically) less than unit elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution σ＞1. In a linearized model, it is possible to show that the 
value of the flexible price equilibrium interest rate in both the home 
and foreign economy, r ̃t and r ̃t*, are functions of the demand shock in 
the home country (assuming that the foreign demand shock is zero). 
Define Δ＝φ (σv (2－v)＋(1－v)2)＋σ＞0.
1 Note that the focus of Cook and Devereux (2011) was fiscal policy. This paper 
abstracts from government spending. The model also uses some insights from 
Beetsma and Jensen (2005).
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which we can write as:
2 2( 1)(2 ) (1 )
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vr r v φ σ σφ φ μ ε
φ σ
− − + + −= +
Δ +               
(2)
In similar manner, we can write the foreign natural nominal interest 
rate as:
2 2
* ( 1) (1 )(2 )
( ) 2t t
vr r v φ σ σφ φ μ ε
φ σ
− + + −= + −
Δ +               
(3)
Defining r ̄≡(1/β )－1 is the steady state net interest rate with 0＜β＜1 
denoting the subjective discount factor.
These equations imply that regardless of home bias, a negative home 
preference shock will reduce the natural interest rate in both economies. 
An important point about this set of equations is that when there is no 
home bias, the natural interest rate is the same in both countries. The 
intuition is that complete risk sharing will equalize the marginal utility 
of consumption relative to the price of the market basket (evaluated in 
a common currency) in the two countries. When there is no home bias, 
the price of the market basket is equalized. According to the Euler equa- 
tion, equalized marginal consumption utility will then imply equalized 
interest rates.
In order to push the natural interest rate in the home economy to zero, 
the shock must satisfy the condition:
12 2




vv rφ σ σφ φ με ε
φ σ
−
⎡ ⎤− − + + −≤ = − ⎢ ⎥Δ +⎣ ⎦          
(4)
However, the condition that the shock pushes the natural rate below 
zero in both economies is




vv rφ σ σφ φ με ε
φ σ
−
⎡ ⎤− + + −≤ = − −⎢ ⎥Δ +⎣ ⎦          
(5)
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Notice also that as v approaches 2, ε ̲LGLOBAL, becomes infinitely large. 
When the economies engage in trade only to a small degree, only a very 
large demand shock in one country can lead to significant spillovers to 
another country.
The ratio of the two threshold values of shocks is: 
:
( 1)(2 ) 1







ε φ σ σ φ
ε φ σ σ φ
− − + += >
− − + +
To put this in a quantitative perspective, we could parameterize φ＝1, 
σ＝2, and v＝1.5 so the home household consumes 3 times as many 
home goods as foreign goods, then the size of the shock needed to push 
both countries natural interest rates below zero would be 8/3 times as 
large as the size of the shock needed to push the source country's natural 
interest rate below zero.
B. New Keynesian International Model
This paper follows Engel (2010) in modelling a New Keynesian interna- 
tional economy with home bias. Define Nt and Nt
* as home and foreign 
labor; and, π t and π t* as home and foreign inflation. Define a variable x̂t 
as the percentage gap between the outcome of Xt and the outcome, that 
would prevail in a flexible price equilibrium, so that x̂t≡ln ( Xt/X̃t ) We 
can arrange log linearized versions of the first order conditions to cons- 
truct an open economy version of the New Keynesian model.
The home economy has an IS curve representing the Euler equation, 
which can be written in terms of the output gap (equal to the employ- 
ment gap), inflation, and interest rates. This is
        
* *





ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ2 (( ) ( ))(1 )
2
t t t t
t t t Ht






⎛ ⎞− − −= − − − −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
For the foreign economy the analogous equation is:
        
* *
1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( )( 1) ( )( ( 1))t t t t t tE n n D v E n n D v+ +− + − + − − −
(7)
* *
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1
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where rt and rt
* represents the interest rate set by the central bank, πH 
is inflation in the price of home produced goods and π F is inflation in 
the price of foreign produced goods. Here we define D≡σv (2－v)＋(1－
v)
2＞0. Note that if v＝1, then D≡σ . Further, it is easy to show that for 
all v we see that if σ＞1 then D－1＝(σ－1) v(2－v)＞0 so D＞1 and also 
σ＞D＝σ＋(1－σ )(1－ν )2.
The supply side of the economy is represented by the New Keynesian 
Phillips curve for the home economy:
*
1ˆ ˆ ˆ[ (1 ) ( 1)]2Ht t t t t Ht
k n n D n D E
D
σπ φ β π +
⎛ ⎞= + + + − +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠           
(8)
and the foreign economy:
* * * *
1ˆ ˆ ˆ[ (1 ) ( 1)]2Ft t t t t Ft
k n n D n D E
D
σπ φ β π +
⎛ ⎞= + + + − +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠           
(9)
where k＝{(1－βκ )(1－κ )}/κ , and 1－κ  is the fraction of firms that receive 
an opportunity to change their prices in every period.
The system (6)-(9) may be solved for the four variables n̂t, n̂t
*, π ̂Ht, and 
π ̂F*t, given an assumption about monetary policy rt and rt* in each coun- 
try. Given strictly positive realizations of the natural interest rate, the 
central bank can achieve both zero inflation and zero output gaps by 
setting the interest rate, rt equal to the natural rate implementing the 
flexible price equilibrium. We focus however on cases where either r ̃t, r̃t*, 
or both are below zero, so the policy interest rate cannot achieve the 
natural real interest rates and simultaneously achieve zero inflation.
It is convenient to rewrite the model in terms of the global economy. 
For any variable x, define x
W＝(x＋x*)/2 as the world average, and xR＝
(x－x*)/2 as the world relative in the variable. Since then x＝x
W＋x R we 
first add both sides of (8) and (9)
  D{π Ht＋π F*t}＝Dkφ {nt＋nt*}＋σ (D) [n̂t*＋n̂t] ＋β DEt{π Ht＋1＋π F*t＋1}
 (10)







Then, add and subtract both sides of (6) and (7) 
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* * *
1 1
2 [{ } { } { }]t t t t t Ht Ft
D E r r r r π π
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= + − + − +
              
(11)
             1 1
1ˆ ˆ{ } [{ } { } ]W W W W Wt t t t t tn n E r r πσ+ +
− = − −
One result implied here is that, conditional on world economic policy,  
rt
W
, the dynamics of world output and inflation are not affected by the 
degree of home bias. Indeed, the dynamics of the world economy are 
equivalent to the canonical New Keynesian closed economy macro model. 







⎛ ⎞ −= + ⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠                     
(12)
So the world natural interest rate is also is also invariant to the degree 
of home bias.
We can also derive the equations for the relative allocation of world 
output gaps and inflation by subtracting both sides of (9) from (8). For 
the world relative New Keynesian Phillips curve, we have:
   
* * * *
1 1{ } { } [{ }] { }Ht Ft t t t t t Ht Ftk n n n n ED
σπ π φ β π π+ +− = − + − + −
(13)
   
1{ } { } { }
R R R
t t t tk n ED
σπ φ β π +
⎛ ⎞= + +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
From the definition of the IS curves, (7) and (6), we have:
   
* *
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and:
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so that, the world relative IS curve is:
            1ˆ ˆ( 1) ( )
R R
t t tv E n n+− −
1 1ˆ ˆ[ { }] (2 ) ( )
R R R R R
t t t t t t t
D E r r E n nπ ν
σ + +
= − − − − −
              (16)
              1 1
ˆ ˆ( ) [ { }]R R R R Rt t t t t t t
DE n n E r r π
σ+ +
− = − −
Note, the difference equations here are affected by the degree of home 
bias, but this operates through the ratio D/σ . However, we can also see 
that differences in the natural interest rate are:









+                         (17)
Define σ D≡σ/D. We can write the four equations of dynamics as:
{π t
W




＋1}                   (18)
1 1
1ˆ ˆ{ } [{ } { } ]W W W W Wt t t t t tn n E r r πσ+ +
− = − −








＋1}                   (20)
1 1
1ˆ ˆ( ) [ { }]R R R R Rt t t t t t tDE n n E r r πσ+ +
− = − −
                
(21)
Note that the dynamics of world averages and differences are separable. 
Also, they are exactly parallel to one another except that the parameter 
of intertemporal substitution governing the latter two equations is σ D 





2(1 )1 ( 1)D D
νσ σ −− = −
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In addition, we have that: 
2 2
2
(1 ) (1 ) 1
(2 ) (1 ) DD v v v
ν ν σ σ
σ
− −= < → <
− + −
Given perfect freedom to set rt and rt
*, each central bank can close 
the interest rate gap in each country, stabilize prices and eliminate the 
output gap. However, we examine the response of the economy when ε t
＜ε ̲LLOCAL so that, at the least, the home central bank cannot close the 
gap. Instead, the home central bank will set rt＝0. We examine the effects 
of demand shocks under different assumptions about the foreign 
central bank.
III. World Liquidity Traps
First, assume that ε t＜ε ̲LGLOBAL, so that neither country can match their 
natural interest rate. Assume that both countries are forced to the zero 





＝0. The once and for all shock has a pro- 
bability 1－μ  reverting back to 0 in each future period. As there are no 
state variables, upon reversion, all the variables will revert to steady 
state. Thus, for any variable xt, Et [xt＋1]＝μxt. Define Ψ＝σ  (1－βμ )(1－μ )
－μk(σ＋φ )＞ΨD＝σ D(1－βμ )(1－μ )－μk(σ D＋φ ). For determinacy of the 
equilibrium, it is required that ΨD＞0. We restrict ourselves to examine 
the symmetric equilibrium.










}.                          (23)
From the Equation, (12), we see that the negative demand shock to the 
home economy has a negative impact on the world average natural inter- 
est rate. First, a negative realization in the world natural interest rate, 
r̃t
W
, due to a demand shock has a negative marginal impact on world 
output. Interestingly, this negative realization is invariant to home bias. 
However, we can also see by inserting (17) into (23) that a negative real- 
ization of ε t will lead to a negative realization of n̂t
R
, indicating that the 
home shock will have a stronger impact on the home economy in the 
case of home bias.
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Since the world average output declines and the decline is relatively 
stronger in the home economy, it is easy to see that home output de- 
clines.
But what about foreign output? In the case of no home bias, we know 
that foreign output would respond identically to the home economy. So 
both economies would share the same natural interest rate and n̂t
R
＝0 
when ν＝1. At the least, in the case with home bias, output will decline 
by less in the foreign economy. However, in the home bias case we can 
also see examples in which, the global liquidity trap will be expansionary 
for the foreign economy. Inserting (1) into (22) we get,




βμ φ μ ε
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Now consider if the shock were exactly sufficient to drive the foreign 
economy into a liquidity trap. This would occur when ε t＝ε ̲LGLOBAL.
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So if ν＞1, so that there is home bias, a negative demand shock from 
the home economy that marginally pushes the foreign economy into a 
liquidity trap will have a positive impact on foreign output. The foreign 
economy faces a decline in demand from home consumers, but also a 
cut in interest rates. As long as the decline in demand is not too large, 
foreign output will expand in the global slump.
We could also consider whether there are situations where a global 
liquidity trap results in expansion for the foreign economy, regardless of 
the size. Consider the Equation (26). As long as the coefficient on ε t, 
given by Γ≡                 is negative, it does not matter how large the 
shock is, a negative demand shock in the home country will lead to an 
increase in foreign output. Conversely, if Γ＞0, then it will always be 
the case that a sufficiently large demand shock can lead to a contraction 
in the foreign economy.
This is a complicated function of a number of parameters, but a para- 
meter of particular interest to us is the degree of home bias. We again 
set φ＝σ＝2, we assume β＝.99 and price setting averaging a price 
change every 4 periods. We set μ＝.5 so the slump lasts an average of 
two quarters. We allow v to vary over the range 1＜ν＜2. Figure 1 reports 
the outcome of Γ at different levels of home bias. Unsurprisingly, when 
the level of ν  is near 1 and the economies have almost no home bias in 
trade, we observe that Γ＞0. In this range, a sufficiently large negative 
demand shock in the home economy must have a negative outcome for 
foreign output. However, as we move away from the no home bias case, 
there can be mildly positive spillovers. Again, this captures the intuition 
that the decline in demand in the home economy does not fall very 
hard on the home economy, yet at the same time the interest rate will 
fall sharply.
Figure 1 shows the response of Γ to a home demand shock. A nega- 
tive outcome for Γ implies that regardless of the size of the negative 





⎛ ⎞−−⎜ ⎟Ψ + Ψ Δ⎝ ⎠
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FIGURE 1
FIGURE 2
Interestingly, we see that a positive spillover is more likely to occur 
when the shock is persistent. We calibrate the model at μ＝.6. Figure 2 
reports Γ under different parameterizations of ν . When the shocks are 
expected to be more persistent, home demand responds more sharply 
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS484
but also we see that the persistent interest rate decline can lead to an 
output expansion in the foreign economy.
IV. Local Liquidity Traps
We also consider the case where ε ̲LGLOBAL＞ε t＞ε ̲LL:OCAL. This can only 
be a relevant case when there is home bias. In this case, rt
* might be 
non-zero, since the foreign country has a natural real interest rate above 
zero. Consider if the foreign central bank continues to eliminate the 
natural real interest rate, so that rt
*＝r̃t
*. Then we have: 
{ } { } { } { }
2
W W R R t
t r t r
rr r r r− = − = −











rn Eβμ ⎡ ⎤Ψ = − ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦                      
(28)
Premultiply both conditions by ΨD, to get:
ˆ (1 )
2
D W D t
t t





rn Eβμ ⎡ ⎤Ψ Ψ ⋅ = Ψ ⋅ − ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
Using these results, we have:




t t t tD
rn n n Eβμ Ψ + Ψ ⎡ ⎤= + = − ⎢ ⎥Ψ Ψ ⎣ ⎦




t t t tD
rn n n Eβμ Ψ − Ψ ⎡ ⎤= − = − ⎢ ⎥Ψ Ψ ⎣ ⎦
Thus, in a local liquidity trap, the home country output always falls. 
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We can also say that since ΨD＜Ψ, a local liquidity trap is always ex- 
pansionary for the foreign economy.
It is also interesting to consider the impact of the freedom that the 
foreign economy has on foreign and domestic output. Say that the foreign 
central bank sets rt
* while rt＝0 due to the domestic economy being in a 
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t t t tD
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…
*ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) [ ]
D
W R
t t t t tDn n n E rβμ
−Ψ − Ψ= − = − +
Ψ Ψ
…
So, taking the home and natural foreign interest rates as given, if the 
foreign economy takes advantage of the home liquidity trap to cut interest 
rates, it will have a positive effect on foreign output, but have a negative 
effect on home output. Note, however, that the impact on world and for- 
eign output will be positive.
V. Conclusion
This paper has first given a calibration of how large a demand shock 
needs to be to lead to a global slump (or zero lower bound), under rea- 
sonable home bias. We have shown that the scale of the global slump 
is invariant to home bias. In either a global or local slump, the home 
country (the source of the negative demand shock) always has a negative 
output response. But we give examples (one analytic, one numerical) of 
cases where the non-source foreign economy's output will increase. The 
analytic case pertains to the situation where the home demand shock is 
only marginally large enough to send the foreign economy to the zero 
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lower bound. The numerical case holds for reasonable paramaterizations. 
Then a home demand shock of any size will lead to a global slump that 
(mildly) increases foreign output.
The general message of the paper is that the international transmission 
of shocks when the world economy is in either a global or local liquidity 
trap can imply surprising and non-intuitive results. As a result, the im- 
plications for international policy (both monetary and fiscal policy) have 
to be assessed with caution.




The model follows Engel (2010), who looked at an optimal policy en- 
vironment with home bias in consumer preferences.
a) Households




( ) ( ( , ) ( ))t t t t
t




               (A1)
where U, and V, represent the utility of the composite home consumption 
bundle Ct, and the disutility of labour supply Nt. U is continuous and 
concave in C while V is continuous and convex in N. The variable ξ t 
represents a preference, or `demand' shock, where we assume that U12 
＞0.
Composite consumption is defined as
/2 1 /2, 1v vt Ht FtC C C v
−= Φ ≥
where Φ＝(v/2)v/2 (1－(v/2))v/2, CHt is the consumption of the home coun- 
try composite good by the home household, and CFt is home consump- 
tion of the foreign good. Limiting v⩾1 insures home bias in preferences 
except when v＝1 in which both countries will equally value goods from 
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both sources.
The composite good, CH, is a unit range of home differentiated goods 
and CF is a unit range of foreign differentiated goods.
1 1
1 1 1 11 11 11 1
0 0
( ) , ( ) , 1.H H F FC C i di C C i diθ θθ θ θ
− −− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= = >⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∫ ∫
where the elasticity of substitution between goods is θ . The home price 









− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥




－v/2 is the (CPI) price index. The first order conditions 
for individual firms can be written as isoelastic functions of relative prices 
with elasticity θ. Nominal wages, Wt are set in competitive markets. The 
optimal labor-consumption trade-off is:
UC(Ct, ξ t)Wt＝PtV’(Nt).                     (A2)
The household in the foreign economy faces an analogous problem 
where St is the nominal exchange rate (home price of foreign currency). 
Foreign households preferences and choices can be defined in parallel. 
The only difference is that the foreign household has weight v/2 on 






. We assume producer currency pricing so the law 
of one prices holds for all goods at all times, so, for example, PF＝SPF
*.
We assume a complete set of state contingent international assets 
markets allowing for complete risk sharing. This implies that nominal 
marginal utility is equated across countries. This implies the following 
equation:
*
* * * * 1( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ,vt tC t t C t t C t t t
t
S PU C U C U C T
P
ξ ξ ξ −= =
             
(A3)
defining T＝SPF
*/PH is the home country terms of trade. Implicit in this 
condition is the assumption that the law of one price holds in individ- 
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ual goods and home and foreign composite consumption goods (i.e., so 
that PF＝SPF
*, etc.). There is also a risk free interest rate in each country 
currency paying an interest rate of Rt in all states of the world. Thus 




( , ) ( , ) .C t t C t tt t
t t
U C U CE R
P P
ξ ξβ + + +
+
=
                 
(A4)
b) Firms
Differentiated goods firms transform labor into goods on a one-to-one 
basis with production function, Yt(i)＝Nt(i) where Yt(i) is output of firm i. 
The home firm profits, Π t( i )＝PHt( i )Yt( i )－Wt Ht( i ) (1－s ), are maximized 
where s is a steady state wage subsidy offered to each home firm by the 
home government, financed with lump-sum taxation. Each home firm 
resets its price along the lines of Calvo where a given firm has an idio- 
syncratic probability of re-adjusting its price, 1－κ .
Firm i adjusts its price to maximizes the present value of profits while 
facing a demand curve with elasticity θ. This leads to the common opti- 






t t j t j t jj
Ht j
t t j t jj










∑                
(A5)
where the stochastic discount factor mt＋j＝                          In the 
aggregate, the price index for the home good then follows the process 
given by: 
1 1 1
1[(1 ) ]Ht Ht HtP P P
θ θ θκ κ− − −−= − +                     (A6)
The behavior of foreign firms and the foreign good price index may be 
described analogously.
c) Market Clearing
Market clearing in the home good is defined as
*




v P v PY C C
P S P
= + −





C t j t jt


















where                      is aggregate home country output, defining Vt＝
               It follows that home country employment (employment 
for the representative individual home household) is given by Nt＝  N(i) 
di＝YHtVt.
The aggregate market clearing condition for the foreign good as
* *
*




v P v S PY C C
P P
= + −
                   
(A8)





d) Flexible Price Equilibrium
Focus on the flexible price equilibrium κ＝0 in each country, κ＝0, 
so PHt(i)＝PHt, PFt(i)＝PFt, and Vt＝Vt




*. Then we may describe a flexible price efficient equili- 
brium by the equations:
UC (C ̃t*, ξ t)＝T ̃t1－v/2 V’(Nt̃),    UC* (C ̃t*, ξ t*)＝T ̃t1－v/2 V’(Ht̃*)      (A9)
UC(Ct̃
*, ξ t)＝UC* (C ̃t*, ξ t*) Ttv－1,                 (A10)
1 /2 /2 *(1 )
2 2
v v
t t t t t
v vN T C T C−= + −
                 
(A11)
* (1 /2) * /2(1 )
2 2
v v
t t t t t
v vN T C T C− − −= + −
               
(A12)
This implicitly describes the efficient world equilibrium for consump- 
tion, output (or employment), and the terms of trade.
Although monetary policy is entirely neutral in this setting, we can 
also define the nominal interest rate that is associated with an optimal 
global flexible price equilibrium. We assume that an optimal policy is to 
set inflation to zero. There is no generality lost in making this assump- 
tion, since as we see below, an optimal unconstrained monetary policy 
in an environment of sticky prices will also set domestic inflation rates 
to zero. Hence, the nominal interest rates that supports the optimal 
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* * *
*
1 1 * * *
1 1 * 1 1
*
1 1
1 ( , ) 1 ( , ),( , ) ( , )
C t t C t t
t t
C t t C t t
t t t t
t t
U C U CR RU C U CP E P EP P
ξ ξ
ξ ξβ β+ ++ + + +
+ +
= =
      
(A13)
In an economy with sticky prices as described below, if monetary author- 
ities can set interest rates as in (A13) without violating the zero lower 
bound constraint, then a globally efficient allocation can be supported. 
Thus, these conditions give us the key information as to when each 
country's optimal monetary policy will be constrained by the zero bound 
on nominal interest rates.
Take a linear approximation around the globally efficient steady state. 
For variable X, define x̃＝ln (X̃/X̅ ) to be the log difference of the global 
efficient value from the steady state, except for and π ̃Ht＋1 and r̃t, which 
refer respectively to the level of the inflation rate and nominal interest 
rate. At steady state, T＝1. Then we may express the linear approximation 
of (A9)-(A13) as:
(1 ) 0
2t t t t
vc nσ ε φ τ− + + − =
                    
(A14)
* * * (1 ) 0
2t t t t
vc nσ ε φ τ− + + − =
                      
(A15)
*( (1 ) ) 2 (1 )
2 2 2 2t t t t
v v v vn cy c c cy τ= + − + ⋅ −
               
(A16)
* *( (1 ) ) 2 (1 )
2 2 2 2t t t t
v v v vn cy c c cy τ= + − − ⋅ −
              
(A17)
* * ( 1) ,t t t t tc c vσ ε σ ε τ− = − + −                      (A18)
where σ≡－(UCCC̅)/UC is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal sub- 
stitution in consumption and φ≡－(V”N̅)/V’ is the elasticity of the mar- 
ginal disutility of hours worked. Finally, ε t＝UCξ /UC ln (ξ t) is the measure 
2 These represent equilibrium values for nominal interest rates, when inflation 
rates are equal to zero. In order to implement this outcome, the monetary author- 
ities must follow a rule in which the price levels in each country are determinate. 
Thus, the zero lower bound constraint must be satisfied even in a flexible price 
economy. We do not pursue the implications of the zero lower bound in this 
setting, because in a purely flexible price economy it would be easy for the 
monetary authority to satisfy the zero lower bound at any value of the real 
interest rate simply by letting the inflation rate adjust costlessly.
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of a positive demand shock in the home country, with an equivalent de- 
finition for the foreign country.
For any variable x, define x
W＝(x＋x*)/2 as the world average, and xR
＝(x－x*)/2 as the world relative in the variable. Since then x＝xW＋x R, 
we can write home and foreign consumption responses to demand shocks 
as:





σ φ σ σ
−
= − + −
+ Δ
2





σ φ σ σ
−
= − − −
+ Δ
A demand shock raises the efficient flexible price world consumption 
level, but the impact on individual country consumption depends on the 
source of the demand shock. A world demand shock will raise the flexible 
price level of home and foreign consumption equally, but a relative home 
country demand shock will raise the flexible price home consumption, 
while reducing the flexible price level of foreign consumption.
The impact of demand shocks on flexible price output levels are like- 
wise written as: 
















A world demand shock raises equilibrium output in both countries. 
When there is home bias in preferences, so that v＞1, a relative home 
demand shock tends to raise home output and reduce foreign output. 
Demand shocks also affect the flexible price efficient response of the 









A home relative demand shock will cause a terms of trade improvement, 
raising the relative price of the home good. 
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If monetary authorities can adjust nominal interest rates freely to 
respond to demand shocks, then the flexible price efficient global equili- 
brium can be sustained. Therefore, the critical issue as regards the limits 
of monetary policy is the impact of the demand shock on the flexible 
price efficient (or `Wicksellian') nominal interest rate. Denote r̃t as the 
(level of the) net nominal interest rate, and r ̄ its steady state value. The 
a log linear approximation of (A13) leads to the expressions for the 
flexible price equilibrium nominal interest rate in the home country as:
1 1 1 1( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )2t t t t t t t t Ht t t t
vr r E c c E E Eσ ε ε π τ τ+ + + += + − − − + + − −    
(A19)
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